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I. INTRODUCTION
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,2 ADEA, is a noble and
important part of employment law in the United States today.3 It is a major
source of federal litigation and a growing factor in the marketplace, and it has
been called the successor to the civil rights suit and the sexual harassment suit
as the major preoccupation of corporate labor attorneys.4
The ADEA is patterned in many ways on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII) which is designed to eliminate most forms of employment
discrimination based upon race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.5 One
important difference between the two statutes, however, is the availability of a
jury in an age discrimination case.6 Title VII cases are heard by a judge acting
as both the trier of law and the trier of fact, a situation that has only recently
changed due to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 7 It has been said
that fear of juror sympathy toward displaced older workers leads employers
and their attorneys to believe that ADEA cases often are won or lost at the
motion stage. 8 The purpose of this Article is to review recent Supreme Court
229 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1988).
3 Dartt v. Shell Oil Co., 539 F.2d 1256, 1260 (10th Cir. 1976), affd, Shell Oil Co. v.
Dartt, 434 U.S. 99 (1977). "The ADEA is remedial and humanitarian legislation and
should be liberally interpreted to effectuate the congressional purpose of ending age
discrimination in employment." Id. at 1260.
4 Richard Green, Over The Hill To The Courthouse, FORBEs, February 24, 1986, at 72.
See also, Visser v. Packer Engineering Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991) ('The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act... is a major source of federal litigation and a
growing factor in American labor markets.")
542 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1985). Both the ADEA and Title VII are administered by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).
629 U.S.C. § 626(c)(2).
7Section 102(c), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
8See Visser v. Packer Engineering Assoc. Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 660-61 (7th Cir. 1991)
("Put simply, employers and their counsel may well conclude that ADEA cases are won
or lost on summary judgment, because jurors find it difficult to close their hearts to the
plight of the terminated older employee but easy to open the purse strings of his
employer.") Presumably, similar sympathies may apply to other civil rights
employment cases under the new Civil Rights Act of 1991.
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"guidance" on standards for summary judgment and directed verdict and the
effect these decisions are having upon ADEA cases.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Legislative History and Purpose of the ADEA
In 1965 the Secretary of Labor reported to Congress on a Labor Department
report titled The Older American Worker-Age Discrimination in Employment.9
According to the report, there existed in the United States "persistent and
widespread use of age limits in hiring that in a great many cases can be
attributed only to arbitrary discrimination against older workers on the basis
of age and regardless of ability."lO According to the legislative history, this
employer attitude persisted despite empirical facts that the psychological and
physiological degeneration associated with aging varies with each individual,
and the fact that many older workers outperform their younger counterparts.11
In his "Older American's" message of January 23, 1967, President Johnson
sought passage of the ADEA to protect older workers from this type of
discrimination.12
The new law was passed by Congress, stating as its purpose: "to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; (and) to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment."13 This law has made it unlawful to discriminate against persons
40 years of age or older with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions or
privileges of employment because of such individual's age."
14
The law, however, provides for some fairly liberal exemptions that are not
always applicable in Title VII cases. Employers who employ fewer than 20
employees are not subject to the Act.15 Title VII, on the other hand, only
exempts those with fewer than 15 employees. 16 Similarly, the ADEA allows that
age (or, more accurately, youth) may be a bona fide occupational qualification
9 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, [hereinafter Adminisrative News] 2213, 2214 (1967).
1OWestern Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 409 (1985).
1id.
12 See Administrative News, supra note 9, at 2214.
1329 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1985).
14Id. at § 623(a)(1).
151d. at § 630(b).
1642 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1985).
1993]
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(BFOQ) for certain positions.17 While Title VII generally recognizes BFOQs,
they are not permitted with respect to matters of race or color.18
Although the substantive law developed in Title VII cases is applied to
ADEA cases, 19 it has been recognized that "the application of that body of law
is unmistakably influenced by the difference in the parties' litigation strategy
created by the availability of a jury trial in ADEA cases, but not Title VII cases."20
The rational desire of defendants and their lawyers to avoid the risk of juror
sympathy has engendered a greater emphasis on summary judgment and
directed verdict motions in ADEA cases than in Title VII cases.21
B. Recent Developments in the Supreme Court Concerning Requirements for
Summary Judgment and Directed Verdict
The procedural requirements for summary judgment and directed verdict
are set out in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.22 Historically, these rules
pursuant to which cases are dismissed before they advance to the jury apply
only if there are no controverted issues of fact upon which reasonable people
could differ.23 In considering either of these motions, the judge should consider
all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposed to the
motion.24
1720 U.S.C. § 623(0(1) (1985).
1842 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1985).
19Overgard v. Cambridge Book Co., 858 F.2d 371, 375 (7th Cir. 1988).
2 0 Visser v. Packer Engineering Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 660 (7th Cir. 1991).
2 1 d. at 661.
22 FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) on "Summary Judgment" provides in pertinent part:
The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law.
Id.
FED. R. CIv. P. 50(a) on "Directed Verdict" provides in pertinent part: "A motion for
directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor." Id.
See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986)('The petitioners suggest, and
we agree, that this standard [Rule 56c] mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a), which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict
if, under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the
verdict.').
23 See generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,322 (1986)('In our view, the plain
language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.").
241d. at 329.
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The year 1986 has been called the "year of the summary judgment."25 In that
year, the Supreme Court handed down three rulings (hereinafter referred to as
the "summary judgment trilogy") which, it has been said, have placed courts
in an era where summary judgments have become respectable. 26 The first
decision, Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio,27 addressed whether the
Third Circuit had applied the proper standards in overturning the district
court's grant of summary judgment.28 The suit was an antitrust case that
concerned American manufacturers' contentions that Japanese companies had
illegally conspired to drive American manufacturers from the U.S. market.
29
The evidence in this case was mountainous. 30 On granting the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, the trial judge ruled that any inference of
conspiracy was unreasonable.3 1 The Third Circuit reversed, concluding that
there was both direct and circumstantial evidence "having some tendency to
suggest that other kinds of concert of action may have occurred."32 Holding
that a reasonable factfinder could find in the plaintiffs' favor, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals overturned the summary judgment.33
On certiorari, the Supreme Court stated that "[t]o survive a motion for
summary judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a
violation of § 1 must present evidence 'that tends to exclude the possibility'
2 5MacDonald v. Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115,1123 (10th Cir.
1991).
2 61d. at 1122. "Summary judgments in these circumstances have not been in disfavor
since the Supreme Court decided (these cases) in 1986." Id. at 1123.
27475 U.S. 574 (1986).
2 81d. at 576.
2 91d. at 578.
30 The Court described the mountain of evidence as follows:
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit runs to 69
pages; the primary opinion of the District Court is more than three times
as long (citation omitted) Two respected District Judges each have
authored a number of opinions in this case; the published ones alone would
fill an entire volume of the Federal Supplement. In addition, the parties
have filed a 40-volume appendix in this Court that is said to contain the
essence of the evidence on which the District Court and the Court of Appeals
based their respective decisions.
Id. at 576-77.
31 The inference was deemed unreasonable:
because (i) some portions of the evidence suggested that petitioners
conspired in ways that did not injure respondents, and (ii) the evidence
that bore directly on the alleged price-cutting conspiracy did not rebut
the more plausible inference that petitioners were cutting prices to compete
in the American market and not to monopolize it.
Id. at 574.
32475 U.S. at 580.
331d. at 581.
19931
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that the alleged conspirators acted independently."34 The Japanese defendants
had argued that the alleged conspiracy was "economically irrational and
practically infeasible."35 The Supreme Court agreed that the defendants had no
rational motive to engage in the action alleged.36 The Court stated that to
survive a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs would have had to
show a genuine issue of material fact as called for in Rule 56(e).37 This would
require in this case a showing of economic injury to plaintiffs and more than a
showing of "metaphysical doubt as to the material facts."38 Quoting from an
earlier Supreme Court decision, the Court stated that "[w]here the record taken
as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving
party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial."' 39 Here, where the Court was
convinced that the claim made no economic sense, the plaintiff was required
to come forward with "more persuasive evidence to support [his] claim than
would otherwise be necessary."40 The Court determined that existing antitrust
law limited the range of permissible inferences from ambiguous evidence as in
this case.41 Thus, in reversing the Third Circuit, the Supreme Court remanded
the case to that court to search the record for other sufficiently unambiguous
evidence that might "permit a trier of fact to find that petitioners conspired to
price predatorily for two decades despite the absence of any apparent motive
to do so."42 Absent such unambiguous evidence, the district court's grant of
summary judgment was proper.
The dissent by Justice White, which Justices Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens
joined, took the majority to task for making "confusing and inconsistent
statements about the appropriate standard for granting summary judgment,"
and for making "a number of assumptions that invade the factfinder's
province."43 The dissenters stated that in requiring the lower courts to consider
the plausibility of the defendants' actions, the majority was suggesting that a
trial judge "in an antitrust case should go beyond the traditional summary
judgment inquiry and decide for himself whether the weight of the evidence
favors the plaintiff."44 They also denied that the cases cited by the majority
34 d.
3 5 d. at 588.
3 61d. at 595.
3 7 FED. R. Cv. PROC. 56(e).
38475 U.S. at 586.
3 9 1d.
401d.
411d. at 588.
42 d. at 597.
43475 U.S. at 599.
44 1d. at 600.
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stood for the propositions claimed. Finally, they stated that "[i]f the Court
intends to give every judge hearing a motion for summary judgment in an
antitrust case the job of determining if the evidence makes the inference of
conspiracy more probable than not, it is overturning settled law, [but if] the
Court does not intend such a pronouncement, it should refrain from using
unnecessarily broad and confusing language."45
The second and least controversial case of the trilogy was Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett.46 In Celotex, a products liability case, the Supreme Court decided that
if a plaintiff fails to make a showing on a summary judgment motion "sufficient
to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,"47 then summary
judgment is proper since there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.48
Justices Brennan, Burger, and Blackmun dissented, but not on the majority's
interpretation of the law; instead, they were concerned that the majority had
not properly applied the law to the facts of this particular case.
Finally, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,49 the Court addressed the issue of
whether a trial court must consider a heightened evidentiary standard in a libel
suit brought by a public figure under the "absence of malice" rationale of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan.50 The district court granted summary judgment,
acknowledging the higher standard of "convincing clarity" in a case controlled
by Sullivan. The District of Columbia Circuit held that, for summary judgment
purposes, the plaintiffs need not show that a jury could find "actual malice"
with convincing clarity, because
to impose the greater evidentiary burden at summary judgment would
change the threshold summary judgment inquiry from a search for a
minimum of facts supporting the plaintiff's case to an evaluation of
the weight of those facts and (it would seem) of the weight of at least
the defendant's uncontroverted facts as well.
51
The Supreme Court launched into an explanation of the materiality and
genuineness requirements of Rule 56 and concluded that in this case the more
important issue was whether the dispute was genuine: "that is, if the evidence
is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party."52
The majority reviewed past precedent and declared that "there is no issue for
451d. at 601.
46477 U.S. 317 (1986).
4 71d. at 322.
48 d. The Court went on to say that the failure to prove an essential element
"necessarily render[s] all other facts immaterial." Id.
49477 U.S. 242 (1986).
50376 U.S. 254 (1964).
51477 U.S. at 247.
52 d. at 248.
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trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury
to return a verdict for that party."53 Summary judgment would be proper, it
said, if the evidence were merely colorable or was not significantly probative.54
In holding that the "convincing clarity" standard is relevant at the summary
judgment stage, the Court stated:
When determining if a genuine factual issue as to actual malice exists
in a libel suit brought by a public figure, a trial judge must bear in mind
the actual quantum and quality of proof necessary to support liability
under New York Times. For example, there is no genuine issue if the
evidence presented in the opposing affidavits is of insufficient caliber
or quantity to allow a rational finder of fact to find actual malice by
clear and convincing evidence.
5 5
The Court went on to say that its holding was not denigrating the role of the
jury, nor was it authorizing trial by affidavits, nor were the traditional
presumptions favoring the non-movant overturned.5 6 Finally, the Court
admonished judges to act with caution in granting summary judgments. 57
In a scathing dissent, Justice Brennan chided the majority for once more
changing the rules on summary judgment while pretending to be explaining
established precedent. According to his dissent, the Court's result was akin to
the child's game of "telephone," where "a message is repeated from one person
to another and then another; after some time the message bears little
resemblance to what was originally spoken," for in this case, "[t]he Court
purports to restate the summary judgment test, but with each repetition, the
original understanding is increasingly distorted."58 He accused the Court of
muddying the water without offering any guidance on how to clarify it. How,
for instance, was a judge to "consider" heightened evidentiary standards? How
shall a judge "assess how one-sided evidence is, or what a 'fair-minded' jury
could 'reasonably' decide?"59 The Court's conflicting clues, he stated, "can lead
only to increased confusion in the district and appellate courts."60
Justice Brennan's sharpest barbs were directed to what he considered the
"invitation--if not an instruction--to trial court to assess and weigh evidence
much as a juror would."61 Nor was he convinced by the Court's instruction that
53 d. at 249.
541d. at 249-50.
55 d. at 254 (emphasis added).
56477 U.S. at 255.
571d.
581d. at 265.
591d.
601d.
61477 U.S. at 265.
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judges should not weigh the evidence.62 He feared that this ruling was written
in terms broad enough to be generally applicable in all types of cases, 63 and
that it would turn summary judgment hearings into "'full blown' paper trials
on the merits."64 Justice Brennan also reiterated justice White's concern in
Matsushita that the Court "should refrain from using unnecessarily broad and
confusing language."65
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger also dissented, predicting more
erratic and inconsistent grants of summary judgment in the future, "largely
because the Court has created a standard that is different from the standard
traditionally applied in summary judgment motions without even hinting as
621d. Justice Brennan further dissented:
I simply cannot square the direction that the judge 'is not himself to
weigh the evidence' with the direction that the judge also bear in
mind the 'quantum' of proof required and consider whether the
evidence is of sufficient 'caliber or quantity' to meet that 'quantum.'
I would have thought that a determination of the 'caliber and quantity,'
i.e., the importance and value, of the evidence in light of the 'quantum,'
i.e., amount required could only be performed by weighing the evidence.
Id. (emphasis in the original).
631d. at 257, n.1.
Presumably, if a district court ruling on a motion for summary judgment
in a libel case is to consider the 'quantum and quality' of proof necessary to
support liability under New York Times... and then ask whether the
evidence presented is of 'sufficient caliber or quantity' to support that
quantum and quality, the court must ask the same questions in a garden
variety action where the plaintiff need prevail only by a mere prepond-
erance of the evidence. In other words, today's decision by its terms
applies to all summary judgment motions, irrespective of the burden of
proof required and the subject matter of the suit.
Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting). But see Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College
District, 934 F.2d 1104, 1110, n.10 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Anderson required that when a
substantive claim mayonly beproved by 'clearand convincing evidence,' a district court
considering a motion for summary judgment must take that heightened evidentiary
standard into account.") The Ninth Circuit was interested in explaining that its
precedential summary judgment case Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998 (9th Cir.
1985) was unaffected by Celotex, Anderson, and Matsushita. That court, apparently, did
not feel that those cases had materially altered the status quo with respect to summary
judgment jurisprudence.
64 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242,267 (1986).
It is hard for me to imagine that a responsible counsel, aware that the
judge will be assessing the 'quantum' of the evidence he is presenting,
will risk either moving for or responding to a summary judgment motion
without coming forth with all of the evidence that he can muster in support
of his client's case. Moreover, if the judge on motion for summary judgment
really is to weigh the evidence, then in my view grave concerns are
raised concerning the constitutional right of civil litigants to a jury trial.
Id. (Brennan, J. dissenting).
651d. at 261, n.2.
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to how its new standard will be applied to particular cases. ' 66 They indicated
that, regardless of what evidentiary standard applied to a particular case,
credibility determinations were the province of jurors and that, although the
quantity of evidence (such as the number of witnesses) arrayed against the
defendant probably goes to the strength of the case, "[as] long as credibility is
exclusively for the jury, it seems the Court's analysis would still require [the]
case to be decided by that body."67
As has been shown, the summary judgment trilogy has generated serious
questions from several of the Justices on the High Court. These cases have also
generated particular interest in the appellate and district courts. The latest
bound volume of Shepard's Citator6 8 lists seven complete pages of references
to Anderson alone.
It could easily be argued that the trilogy encourages the use of summary
judgment and directed verdict by signaling that such cases would be reviewed
less stringently by the Supreme Court in future appeals. On the other hand,
there is considerable language in these three cases from which a jurist could
conclude that very little has changed in summary judgment jurisprudence.69
661d. at 273.
671d. at 270.
68 SHEPARD'S UNITED STATES CITATIONS, 6TH ED., CASE EDITION SUPPLEMENT 1988-1990,
Part 5 (McGraw-Hill 1990).
69 See Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104,1110 n.10
(9th Cir. 1991) where the court noted:
Although it may be self-evident, we note here that nothing in Celotex
affects our decision in Lowe. Celotex involved the question whether a party
moving for summary judgment satisfies its burden of production by
simply pointing to the absence of any record evidence demonstrating the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact. Lowe, in contrast, involved the
situation where the nonmoving party has produced record evidence-albeit
'very little'-giving rise to an inference of intentional discrimination.
Lowe is also unaffected by the Supreme Court's decisions in Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby and Matsushita. Anderson required that when a substantive claim
may only be proved by 'clear and convincing evidence,' a district court con-
sidering a motion for summary judgment must take that heightened eviden-
tiary standard into account. The ultimate burden of persuasion in Lowe,
however, was that of proving intentional discrimination by a preponderance
of the evidence. Matsushita is also not on point. There, the Supreme Court held
that when the factual context rendered a claimed antitrust violation implausi-
ble because the claim made no economic sense, the plaintiffs must produce
more evidence than would normally be necessary in order to defeat sum-
mary judgment. No such factual considerations existed in Lowe, nor do
they exist in the case before us today.
Id. (citations omitted).
It can be argued that the Ninth Circuit has given an extremely literal interpretation
to the trilogy. It should also be noted that Lowe was a sex discrimination case where the
trial was to a judge alone, and not to a jury as in an age discrimination case. It can be
questioned whether the summary judgment standards are identical in these two
circumstances.
[Vol. 41:103
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Therefore, appellate courts could view the more expansive language in these
cases as an invitation, but not a mandate, to be more flexible when reviewing
summary judgments from overworked trial court judges.70 It could reasonably
be said that the trilogy merely improved the climate for summary judgments
or, in the words of Judge Seth of the Tenth Circuit, created an era where they
"have become respectable.' 71
C. Procedural Complexities in ADEA Cases
Complicating matters in ADEA cases is the notion that in considering
motions for summary judgment or directed verdict, the judge "must consider
both the substantive law of employment discrimination and burdens of proof
under this law."72 To permit a plaintiff in a Title VII or ADEA intentional
discrimination case 73 to make a case without direct or "smoking gun" evidence,
70 See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990). The court stated:
The growing difficulty that district judges face in scheduling civil trials, a
difficulty that is due to docket pressures in general and to the pressure of
the criminal docket in particular, makes appellate courts reluctant to
reverse a grant of summary judgment merely because a rational factfinder
could return a verdict for the nonmoving party, if such a verdict is highly
unlikely as a practical matter because the plaintiff's case (or the defense, in
the rare case where it is the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment that
was granted) is marginal.
Id. at 403.
See also Palucki v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 879 F.2d 1568 (7th Cir. 1989) in which Judge
Posner expressed similar views:
The workload crisis of the federal courts, and realizing that Title VII is
occasionally or perhaps more than occasionally used by plaintiffs as a
substitute for principles of job protection that do not yet exist in Amer-
ican law, have led the courts to take a critical look at efforts to withstand
defendants' motions for summary judgment. A district judge... must
decide.., whether the state of the evidence is such that, if the case
were tried tomorrow, the plaintiff would have a fair chance of obtaining a
verdict.
Id. at 1572-73. Despite the reference to possible abuse of Title VII, the Palucki case
involved the ADEA.
71See infra note 132.
72 Visser v. Packer Engineering Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 661 (7th Cir. 1991), (citing
Weihaupt v. American Medical Ass'n, 874 F.2d 419, 424 (7th Cir. 1989)). See also
MacDonald v. Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Center, 941 F.2d 1115, 1122 (10th Cir.
1991)(Seth, J. concurring).
There is an interaction of doctrines in cases decided on summary judg-
ment motions in ADEA actions as in the one before us. This consists of
the application of doctrines as to the sequence and burden of going
forward with the proof, as derived from McDonnell Douglas, mixed with
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to the burdens placed on the
movant and the nonmovant in summary judgment cases as construed by
Celotex, Liberty Lobby, and Matsushita Elec., and encouraged by those cases.
73This does not include plaintiff's making an unintentional, or disparate impact,
discrimination case.
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the United States Supreme Court established a burden shifting three-step
analysis in the case of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.74 In that case, Green,
a black mechanic for McDonnell Douglas, was laid off as part of a reduction in
force (RIF). He was a self-avowed racial activist who protested his discharge
and the company's hiring practices. He participated in at least one disruptive
action outside the company premises, a so-called "stall-in" where the plant
entrance was blocked at the morning shift change. Thereafter, the company
advertised that it was hiring mechanics. Green applied, but was turned down.
The company cited his disruptive activity as its reason for failing to offer him
a job. Green went to the EEOC claiming he was not rehired because of his civil
rights activities. At trial, the judge believed the company's proffered
explanation and held against Green. There was no smoking-gun evidence of
discrimination with which to resolve the parties' opposing factual contentions.
The Court decided that in cases of this type, the complainant must carry the
initial burden under Title VII of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination, which could be done by showing:
(i) that the complainant belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that the
complainant had applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking candidates; (iii) that despite the complainant's
qualifications, he or she was rejected; and (iv) that, after the
complainant's rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons with complainant's
qualifications.
75
At that point the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for [respondent's] rejection."76 The complainant
then must be afforded a fair opportunity to show that the employer's stated
reason for the rejection was in fact a pretext, or in other words, that the
"presumptively valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a cover-up for a
racially discriminatory decision."77
The Court thought that evidence demonstrating that white employees who
had engaged in the stall-in were treated better than the plaintiff in this case
would have been especially relevant to showing pretext in this case.78 Other
relevant, but seemingly less powerful evidence of pretext would have included
things such as the company's prior treatment of the plaintiff, its reaction to his
prior valid civil rights activities, and the company's general practice and policy
with regard to minority employment.79
74411 U.S. 792 (1972).
75Id. at 802.
76 Id.
77 d. at 805.
781d. at 804.
79411 U.S. at 802-05.
[Vol. 41:103
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/6
INTENTIONAL AGE DISCRIMINATION
A complementary case to McDonnell Douglas is Texas Department of
Community Affairs v. Burdine.80 The specific question raised in that case was
whether, after the plaintiff has established a prima facie case, "the burden shifts
to the defendant to persuade the court by a preponderance of the evidence that
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the challenged activity existed." 81
The Supreme Court decided that the ultimate burden of proof remains with the
plaintiff.82 The defendant's burden is a burden of production--to produce
evidence of legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. According to Burdine, the
burden of proving the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is not onerous.
83
Once the plaintiff has met this burden, the defendant rebuts the presumption
of discrimination created by the prima facie case by showing "through the
introduction of admissible evidence, the reasons for plaintiff's rejection." 84
Should the defendant not meet his or her burden of production, then the
plaintiff will prevail based upon the prima facie case. However, the defendant's
burden of production is not particularly onerous: "The defendant need not
persuade the court that it was actually motivated by the proffered reasons...
. It is sufficient if the defendant's evidence raises a genuine issue of fact as to
whether it discriminated against the plaintiff."85 The Appeals Court had placed
a burden of persuasion upon the defendant to convince the court of its
proffered reasons, fearing that if an employer only had to articulate (as opposed
to prove) its lawful reasons, then it could offer "fictitious, but legitimate
reasons."86 The Supreme Court was not persuaded. 87
80450 U.S. 248 (1980).
81Id. at 250.
821d. at 253.
831d.
841d. at 255.
85450 U.S. at 254-55. The Seventh Circuit in Aungst v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,
937 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1991), stated "This burden, however, is merely a burden of
production ... that is not difficult to satisfy." 937 F.2d at 1220. "We must give the
employer the benefit of the doubt regarding its explanation of employment decisions
... With respect to an employer's explanation for an employee's discharge, we again
note that we do 'not sit as a super-personnel department that reexamines an entity's
business decisions." Id.
86450 U.S. at 257-58.
871d. The Court stated:
We do not believe, however, that limiting the defendant's evidentiary
obligation to a burden of production will unduly hinder the plaintiff. First,
as noted above, the defendant's explanation of its legitimate reasons must
be clear and reasonably specific. This obligation arises both from the
necessity of rebutting the inference of discrimination arising from the
prima facie case and from the requirement that the plaintiff be afforded
'a full and fair opportunity' to demonstrate pretext. Second, although
the defendant does not bear a formal burden of persuasion, the defendant
nevertheless retains an incentive to persuade the trier of fact that the employ-
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In the subsequent case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,88 Justice O'Connor 89
elaborated on McDonnell Douglas in a concurring opinion. In that case, she
wrote, the Court dealt with a situation where the plaintiff had presented no
"direct evidence"90 of illegal discrimination.9 1 She noted that the prima facie
case "was not difficult to prove, and was based only on the statistical probability
that when a number of potential causes for an employment decision are
eliminated an inference arises that an illegitimate factor was in fact the
motivation behind the decision."92 It has been often noted in discrimination
cases that the employer's true motive is rarely easy to discern and that the intent
question is a pure question of fact.93
The complainant's rebuttal of the employer's proffered legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons, by which the complainant attempts to show
"pretext" on the employer's part, may be shown by direct or indirect means as
set out in McDonnell Douglas. It is an axiom in these cases that discrimination
is rarely provable by "smoking gun" evidence.94 It was stated in Burdine that
the plaintiff could carry his or her burden of persuasion by attempting to show
that the employer's proffered reasons were pretextual "either directly by
persuading the trier of fact that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated
ment decision was lawful. Thus, the defendant normally will attempt to
prove the factual basis for its explanation. Third, the liberal discovery
rules applicable to a civil suit in federal court are supplemented in a Title
VII suit by the plaintiff's access to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission's investigatory files concerning her complaint. Given these
factors, we are unpersuaded that the plaintiff will find it particularly difficult
to prove that a proffered explanation lacking a factual basis is a pretext. We
remain confident that the McDonnell Douglas framework permits the
plaintiff meriting relief to demonstrate intentional discrimination.
Id. at 258.
88490 U.S. 228 (1989).
8 9Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion is important because the decision was a
plurality opinion in which she and Justice White filed opinions concurring in the
judgment. Justice Brennan, since departed from the Court, wrote the main opinion, in
which he was joined by Justices Marshall (similarly departed), Blackmun and Stevens.
90Evidence in form of testimony from a witness who actually saw, heard or
touched the subject of interrogation... Evidence, which if believed,
proves existence of fact in issue without inference or presumption ... That
means of proof which tends to show the existence of a fact in question, with-
out the intervention of the proof of any other fact, and is distinguished
from circumstantial evidence, which is often called "indirect."
BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 460 (6th ed. 1990).
91490 U.S. at 270.
921d.
93See, e.g., Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College, 934 F.2d 1004,1111 (9th
Cir. 1991).
94 See, e.g., Visser v. Packer Engineering Assoc., Inc., 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991).
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the employer or indirectly by showing that the employer's proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.' 95
III. RECURRING ISSUES AND UNANSWERED QUESTIONS IN ADEA SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DIRECTED VERDICT CASES
At the summary judgment or directed verdict stages, ADEA cases are
superimposed (or overlaid) with the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework
and the summaryjudgment guidelines set out both in Rule 56 and the summary
judgment trilogy. While ADEA cases are unique, they are also prone to certain
recurring or standard fact situations, legal issues, and arguments. This section
will analyze these recurring patterns in light of these procedural "overlays."
In the usual ADEA discharge case based on intentional discrimination, the
employee either has been discharged during an alleged "reduction in force", or
has been discharged for some more personalized reason. The plaintiff will
normally make a prima facie showing under McDonnell Douglas. The employer
will then offer the RIF or personalized justifications as a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge. Some courts have elevated a RIF
to the status of a "heightened standard" under Anderson, requiring more of a
showing from the discharged employee in order to avoid summary
judgment.96
Also at the "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" stage, the employer often
proffers evidence of poor performance on the part of the discharged
employee.97 Sometimes courts find the employer's documentary evidence so
overwhelming that any hint of pretext is simply "implausible" (as in
Matsushita).98
At the "pretext" stage, the "quality, quantity, and caliber" of the employer's
and employee's evidence is often in dispute. It is not unusual for courts to
dismiss the employee's evidence as nothing more than "mere speculation and
conjecture." This was the case in Matsushita's derogation of "metaphysical
doubts," and Anderson's dismissal of merely colorable or not significantly
probative evidence. 99 Some courts require more than evidence tending to show
that the employer's proffered reason is not believable in order for the employee
to avoid summary judgment. These courts require evidence of age "animus."OO
95450 U.S. at 256.
96See, e.g., Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 128 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 181 (1991).
97This is true both inside and outside of the RIF situation, because in a RIF the
employeroften determines whom to keep and whom to terminate on the basis of relative
performance. The ADEA is not a tenure statute for older workers who are released in
favor of more productive younger workers.
98 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574,587 (1986).
99 See supra notes 22-71 and accompanying text.
lOOSee infra note 108.
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Failure to produce evidence of such animus will justify a summary judgment
in those courts: arguably, this amounts to a failure to produce evidence of an
"essential element" under Celotex, but it is more typically viewed as a lack of
"significantly probative evidence" to show the pretext of masked illegal
discrimination as in Anderson. Merely showing that the employer was incorrect
in its evaluation of the discharged employee will seldom prevent summary
judgment against the employee, because an employer is entitled to make bad
business decisions so long as they are not influenced by improper age-related
motives.
In most of these situations, the employer seems to have an advantage in the
summary judgment contest (since the discussion above relates to justifications
for granting summary judgments against plaintiffs). Where, however, the
employee is able to adduce direct evidence of age animus, normally age-biased
comments, derogatory remarks, and certain "talismanic" expressions made by
decisionmakers of the employer close to the time of the adverse decision
concerning the employee, then such direct evidence is normally held under
Price Waterhouse to create a "dual motive" case where the employer has the
burden of persuasion to prove that it would have taken the same action absent
the impermissible motive. The dual motive case may be viewed as a
"heightened standard" under Anderson which works to the detriment of the
employer seeking summary judgment. Mere "stray remarks" under Price
Waterhouse, or remarks made in jest, in the distant past, or by
non-decisionmakers, are often viewed as too weak to raise a genuine issue of
material fact (as in Anderson's interest in the "quality and caliber" of the
evidence).
With this summary in mind, the remainder of this section shall be devoted
to reviewing each of these recurring or "standard" ADEA issues in detail.
A. The Effect of Casting Doubt on the Employer's Proffered Reasons (On Raising
a Genuine Issue of Material Fact, or On Failing to Produce Evidence of an
Essential Element of the Employee's Case)
Considerable controversy has been generated in the circuit courts over the
parameters of the Burdine indirect showing of pretext: that the proffered
explanation is "unworthy of credence." In the recent case of Connell v. Bank of
Boston,101 the employer was a bank that was undergoing a reorganization due
to changed business conditions. It eliminated the plaintiff's job, reassigned
several employees from plaintiff's unit, and discharged plaintiff and one other
employee. The reassigned workers and the other discharged employee were
younger than plaintiff who was 47 years old. Plaintiff made his prima facie
showing of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas rationale (which in
age discrimination discharge cases is modified) by showing (i) that he was in
the protected class of persons; (ii) that he was performing his job at a level that
101924 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2828 (1991).
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met his employer's legitimate expectation; and (iii) that he was replaced by
someone with roughly similar qualifications. 102
The bank's proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons were plaintiff's
poor work performance relative to his fellow unit employees and the
reorganization. The court recognized that the articulation of these reasons
nullified the McDonnell Douglas inference of discrimination. Plaintiff, having
overcome his "first hurdle" with his prima facie showing, was now required to
clear the "second hurdle." He needed to show that the proffered reasons were
only a pretext for age discrimination. The plaintiff could not save himself from
summary judgment by merely casting doubt or refuting the articulated reasons
of the defendant.10 3 The court stated that the plaintiff was required to "show a
discriminatory animus based on age."104 This animus could be shown without
the proverbial "smoking gun."105
The court acknowledged that this is not an area that can be addressed by
formula. Recognizing that the intent issue is a pure question of fact, the court
felt that the plaintiff had not offered sufficient evidence from which a
reasonable jury could infer age animus. Plaintiff had offered affidavits from
former employees alleging age discrimination, but the court deemed them
insufficient for several reasons, including the fact that they lacked sufficient
facts to justify the conclusions stated. 106 In a strongly worded dissent, Judge
Bownes took the First Circuit to task for adopting a unique three prong
approach for avoiding summary judgment: the prima facie case, proving the
proffered reasons are pretextual, and adducing additional evidence of age
animus.107 Judge Bownes surveyed cases from the other circuits and argued
that only the Fourth Circuit might be aligned with the First Circuit in requiring
the "additional" evidence of animus.10 8
1021d. at 1172.
103Id. at 1175 (citing Dea v. Look, 810 F.2d 12, 17 (1st Cir. 1987)).
104Id. at 1172.
105Id. 1172, n.3
We do not suggest that the plaintiff must, necessarily, offer affirmative
evidence of age animus in addition to rebutting the employer's evidence.
Rather, the evidence as a whole, whether direct or indirect, must be suf-
ficient for a reasonable fact finder to infer that the employer's decision
was motivated by age animus.
Id.
106See FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
107924 F.2d at 1183.
10 8Id. at 1184. The Second, Third, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits had decided
cases cited by Judge Bownes that stated, at least for summary judgment purposes, a
showing of pretext is sufficient to support an inference of discrimination. As the cited
case from the 8th Circuit stated: "As a matter of both common sense and federal law, an
employer's submission of a discredited explanation for firing a member of a protected
class is itself evidence which may persuade the finder of fact that such unlawful
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In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Torres approved of the animus
requirement when the case has gone to trial, but not at the summary judgment
stage. He offered an example of a company that would not be guilty of
discrimination for firing a 41 year-old employee, where it had offered the
pretext of unsatisfactory work, but had actually desired to create a job for an
unemployed relative.109 The judge agreed with the holding of the case because
he reasoned that the plaintiff had not presented sufficient evidence to support
an inference of pretext, and clearly not evidence of pretext "plus" animus.
Arguably, the majority would hold that an employer who was withholding
its true "nondiscriminatory" reason from the court could still prevail at
summary judgment if the plaintiff were unable to demonstrate evidence of
animus. One can question why such a defendant should qualify for such
favorable treatment.
In affirming the summary judgment in this case, the majority mentioned
both Anderson and Celotex, but only in a generalized fashion, with no indication
that it found either of these holdings important or dispositive of this case. The
court did not view this case as involving a heightened standard of proof above
a preponderance of the evidence. The court did not rely on Celotex, which
presumably it could have done if it had felt that the plaintiff had failed to
produce evidence of an essential element of his case. Instead, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of
material fact because he failed to show age animus except through speculation,
conjecture, and flawed affidavits.
The court in Connell relied on its earlier decision in Medina-Munoz v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 110 in which a discharged worker protected by the ADEA
was subjected to a summary judgment. Relying heavily on Anderson, the court
held that summary judgment was correct since the plaintiff, who had cast
doubt on the company's legitimate reasons, had produced no evidence of
discriminatory animus based on age. The court stated that when the employer
has proffered a legitimate reason for its actions, the plaintiff "must elucidate
specific facts which would enable a jury to find that the reason given was not
only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the employer's real motive: age
discrimination."111 Again, the court did not base its decision on the failure to
produce evidence of an "essential element" under Celotex. Rather, it quoted
Anderson for the proposition that there was "no 'significantly probative'
evidence to show that the pretext masked age discrimination."1 12 As will be
discrimination actually occurred." MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 856 F.2d 1054,
1057-59 (8th Cir. 1988).
109924 F.2d at 1180.
110896 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1990).
1111d. at 9 (citing Celotex for the proposition that "summary judgment opponent who
bears burden of proof on an issue must reliably demonstrate existence of genuine
dispute as to material facts.").
112Id.
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seen below, when an additional element is elevated to the prima facie case level,
courts tend to cite Celotex as the relevant trilogy decision. The court analyzed
the plaintiff's proffered proof of age animus, but dismissed it, essentially, as
implausible, without making any reference to Matsushita.113
In Villanueva v. Wellesley College,114 a denial of tenure case, the trial court
granted the employer's motion for summary judgment. The First Circuit, in
affirming the trial court, took an opportunity to respond to Judge Bowne's
criticism, stating that "when, as here, the employer has articulated a
presumptively legitimate reason for discharging an employee, the latter must
elucidate specific facts which would enable a jury to find that the reason given
was not only a sham, but a sham intended to cover up the employer's real
motive:... discrimination."115 The court reiterated its argument that this is not
an additional requirement over and above that imposed in the McDonnell
Douglas case; rather, it is mandated by Rule 56's requirement that the
non-moving party demonstrate the existence of a "material fact."116 The First
Circuit apparently continues to allow an employer to mislead the court as to
the employer's true motivation and not suffer any penalty. 1 7 The court
referred to Anderson in a general fashion, without purporting to find it
important to the resolution of this particular case.118 Again, the plaintiff had
failed to accomplish anything more than to cast doubt upon the employer's
articulated reason, an insufficient showing in the First Circuit.119
A less stringent attitude concerning the effect of casting doubt upon the
employer's proffered reason is found in the recent decision, Goetz v. Farm Credit
Services,120 in which the Eighth Circuit stated that "as a matter of both common
sense and federal law, an employer's submission of a discredited explanation
for firing a member of a protected class is itself evidence that may persuade the
1131d. ("It is too large a leap to apply the report's conclusions to managers.") See also
id. at 10, n.5 ("Medina's garbled reference to two pages of figures prepared by Perez,
entitled '1984 Value Analysis,' is so faroff any conceivable mark that weneed notdignify
it by elaboration.")
114930 F.2d 124 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 181 (1991).
11SId. at 127 (citing Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5,9 (1st Cir.
1990)).
116Id. at 128.
117Id.
Nondiscriminatory motive is immaterial to a discrimination case; therefore,
the mere showing that the employer's articulated reason may shield another
(possibly nondiscriminatory) reason does not create a dispute of material fact.
Only if there is evidence from which a reasonable inference of discrimination
can be drawn has the plaintiff defeated the summary judgment motion.
Id.
118Id.
119930 F.2d at 131.
120927 F.2d 398 (8th Cir. 1991).
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finder of fact that such unlawful discrimination actually occurred.' 121 In Goetz,
an older secretary was terminated during a RIF, while a younger secretary was
retained. 122 In affirming the summary judgment, the court held that the
plaintiff had failed, as a matter of law, to show a genuine issue of material fact.
In fact, she had merely attempted to demonstrate inconsistencies in her
ex-employer's proffered reasons. 123 There was no mention of a "heightened
standard"124 nor was an "essential element" said to be lacking. The court
believed that the plaintiff had failed to raise any genuine issue of pretext due
to a lack of probative evidence (as in Anderson's concern over possible
deficiencies in the quality and quantum of the evidence).125
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit in Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc.,126
stated that "if the employer offers a pretext-a phony reason-for why it fired the
employee, then the trier of fact is permitted, although not compelled, to infer
that the real reason was age."127 In Shager v. Upjohn Co., 12 8 Judge Posner has
succinctly stated the view of the Seventh Circuit:
If the only reason an employer offers for firing an employee is a lie, the
inference that the real reason was a forbidden one, such as age, may
rationally be drawn. This is the common sense behind the rule of
McDonnell Douglas. It is important to understand however that the
inference is not compelled. The trier of fact must decide after a trial
whether to draw the inference. The lie may be concealing a reason that
is shameful or stupid but not proscribed, in which event there is no
liability. The point is only that if the inference of improper motive can
be drawn, there must be a trial.129
121Id. at 400-01 (quoting MacDissi v. Valmont Indus., Inc., 865 F.2d 1054, 1059 (8th
Cir. 1988)).
1221d. at 400.
1231d. at 405. See infra section C; the court was extremely impressed with the quantity
and quality of the employer's documented proof which along with other reasons made
it extremely implausible that the employer was out to "get" this employee because of
her age.
12 4Despite the fact that some courts hold that a reduction in force calls for a heightened
standard. See infra section D.
125Goetz, 927 F.2d at 406.
126924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991).
12 71d. at 657 (citing Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990)).
128913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
1291d. at 401 (citation omitted). Judge Posner's opinion makes only passing reference
to Anderson as standing for the proposition that "if this were a trial rather than a
summary judgment proceeding, would the judge be required to grant a directed verdict
to that party seeking summary judgment?" Id. at 402.
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In MacDonald v. Eastern Wyoming Mental Health Center,130 the Tenth Circuit's
result, without discussion of the animus issue, was in accord with that of the
First Circuit. In this summary judgment affirmance, the husband and wife
plaintiffs were fired from their positions as psychologist and therapist,
respectively, after a series of problems with the administration for reasons
demonstrably unrelated to age. While the plaintiffs cast doubt upon the
proffered reasons, the court did not deem that doubt alone as sufficient to deny
the summary judgment. There was no credible evidence that the real reason
was age discrimination; rather the only reasonable inference was a desire to
retaliate against the plaintiffs due to their outspokenness. 131 The court made
no reference to the trilogy, but Judge Seth acknowledged the importance of
these cases in a separate opinion:
I feel that I must write a separate opinion as this case presents part of
an ongoing and unfinished resolution of summary judgments in
ADEA cases by the trial courts. There is an inter-action of doctrines in
cases decided on summary judgment motions in ADEA actions as in
the one before us. This consists of the application of doctrines as to the
sequence and burden of going forward with the proof, as derived from
McDonnell Douglas, mixed with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
as to the burdens placed on the movant and the non-movant in
summary judgment cases as construed by Celotex, Liberty Lobby, and
Matsushita Elec., and encouraged by those cases. The courts are
apparently now placed in an era when summary judgments in these
cases have become respectable .... Summary judgments in these
circumstances have not been in disfavor since the Supreme Court
decided in 1986 Celotex Corp., Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, and Matsushita
Elec. 1986 was the year of the summary judgment. Perhaps the most
significant was Matsushita wherein the Court in substance held that
this question should be put: considering all the evidence submitted,
would a rational trier of fact find for the non-movant. This necessarily
required the non-movant to have met a greater burden in opposition
to the motion.
132
130941 F.2d 1115 (10th Cir. 1991).
13 1 d. at 1122. The court stated:
While the MacDonalds may have created a genuine question as to
whether the proffered reasons were the real reasons for their discharge,
they have offered no credible evidence that the real reason was age discri-
mination. To the contrary, assuming the proffered reasons were pretextual,
the only reasonable inference to be drawn from this record is that defendants
were motivated not by age discrimination but by the desire to retaliate
against the MacDonalds for criticizing Center practices.
Id.
13 2Id. at 1122-23.
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B. The Effect of Poor Business Judgment (On Raising a Genuine Issue
of Material Fact)
In Aungst v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,133 a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict was granted against an ADEA plaintiff.134 The Seventh Circuit
explained why it agreed with the trial judge's action in this case involving an
engineer who, after thirty-five years of loyal service, was laid off in a RIF. After
the articulation of the employer's legitimate reason, lack of "versatility" on the
part of the plaintiff who was otherwise a satisfactory employee, the plaintiff
was required to answer the proffered reason with specificity.135 Under Seventh
Circuit precedent, there were three suggested methods to demonstrate pretext
by indirect means (when there is no "smoking gun evidence"): (1) that the
alleged reasons had no basis in fact; (2) if they did, that they were not really
factors motivating the discharge; or (3) if they were, that they were jointly
insufficient to motivate the discharge.136 Under the specific facts of this case,
the plaintiff needed to attack the "lack of versatility" reason by showing: (1) that
the company was not really concerned with versatility; (2) and if it was, plaintiff
was fired for reasons other than lack of versatility; or (3) if lack of versatility
was the actual reason, then plaintiff must show that lack of versatility should
not have caused him to be chosen for the RIF.137 The Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals noted, however, that it does not sit as a "super-personnel
department."138 Rather, its concern is "whether the employer gave an honest
133937 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1991).
134Judgment notwithstanding the verdict can legitimately be analogized to summaryjudgment and directed verdict, since the issue is whether a rational factfinder could
have reached the same conclusion as this particular jury. There is a presumption,
however, in favor of the verdict being legitimate. See Kimberly K. Fayssonx, Note, The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and Trial by Jury: Proposals for Change, 73
VA. L. REV. 601,603 (1987) which states, "Conducting jury trials under a burden of proof
scheme developed for non-jury Title VII actions has, however, resulted in a considerable
number of judgments notwithstanding the verdict and reversals on appeal in ADEA
cases." Id.
135937 F.2d at 1223. The court said,
[T]o show pretext, it does not help for the plaintiff to repeat the proof that
his job performance was generally satisfactory. That question has already
been resolved in his favor. The Company advanced specific reasons for
his discharge, and his rebuttal evidence should be focused on them. The
court finds no proof that employees of any age with similar work credentials
were accorded more favorable treatment.
Id. (citation omitted).
136Id. at 1221.
1371d. See also Connell v. Bank of Boston, 924 F.2d 1169,1181 (1stCir. 1991), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 2828 (1991) (Torres, J., concurring) ("Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether
the articulated reason is factually correct but whether it really prompted the employer's
action.").
138See supra note 85.
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explanation of its behavior."139 It would seem that if the employee was
demonstrably the most versatile employee in the company, labelling him as
non-versatile would be patently implausible, thereby casting sufficient doubt
upon the veracity of the employer, and assuring a chance for a jury.
According to the Fifth Circuit, the plaintiff may demonstrate pretext by
evidence showing that the reason given by the employer "though facially
adequate, was untrue as a matter of fact or was, although true, a mere cover or
pretext for illegal discrimination."140 That Circuit has written that when
indirectly trying to demonstrate pretext by showing the proffered reasons are
unworthy of credence, the evidence "must extend beyond casting doubt on the
reasonableness of the employer's action; otherwise the law would be converted
to a 'just cause' provision for the protected class of employees, an effect that
Congress clearly did not intend."141
In Billet v. Cigna Corp., 142 a long-term employee who lost his job due both to
a restructuring as well as problems with his supervisor, claimed that the
reasons offered were pretextual. The employer offered voluminous proof of
deficiencies in the employee's recent performance. The employee cast
significant doubt upon the significance of several of the allegations. Regardless,
the Third Circuit, in upholding a directed verdict against the plaintiff, held that
the employee's view of his own performance is immaterial, stating "what
matters is the perception of the decisionmaker."143 A company is entitled to
make subjective business decisions, even wrong ones, so long as the motive is
not illegal discrimination. 144 The court held that the plaintiff's evidence was
insufficient to create a jury question regarding the company's articulated
concerns over his performance.
C. The Effect of Employer Documentation of Poor Performance by the Employee
(On Making Pretext Implausible)
Due to the significance that some circuits place upon the employer's
subjective belief in its stated reasons, it would appear that documentation, like
that in the Billet case, would greatly bolster the employer's motion seeking
summary judgment or directed verdict. In Billet, the court was truly impressed
with the detailed records maintained by the employer, stating that "there was
139937 F.2d at 1220 (citing Mechnig v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 864 F.2d 1359, 1365 (7th
Cir. 1988)).
140Normand v. Research Institute of America, Inc., 927 F.2d 857, 859 (5th Cir. 1991).
141Hanchey v. Energas Co., 925 F.2d 96, 98 (5th Cir. 1990). In Shager v. Upjohn Co.,
913 F.2d 398,401 (7th Cir. 1990), Judge Posner spoke of jury perceptions: "The statute is
not a guarantee of tenure for the older worker, although not all juries understand this."
Id.
142940 F.2d 812 (3rd Cir. 1991).
1431d. at 825.
1441d.
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simply too much objective evidence of problems with Billet's performance to
make his claim of pretext plausible."145 The plaintiff, anticipating a problem
with the detailed records, apparently felt that the best defense was a good
offense, and attacked the documentation process itself claiming "that the
documented criticism of his performance during this period was not made in
good faith and was designed for the sole purpose of creating a record to
withstand an age discrimination case."146 The court stated that it could "not
understand why it is improper for an employer to maintain records regarding
an employee's conduct even if it recognizes that the record may be useful in
defense against a discrimination claim. Indeed, it would be expected that an
employer would do exactly that."1 47
In Danielson v. City of Lorain,148 a sixty-seven year old secretary (who had
been hired at the age of sixty-five) was terminated after a two-year long battle
with her supervisor and others over her alleged poor work performance. Her
personnel file was replete with samples of poor work, deficient evaluations,
and memoranda of complaint stretching over a two year period. The Sixth
Circuit affirmed the trial court's directed verdict in favor of the employer
concluding that "a reasonable fact finder could not find that all of Danielson's
supervisors created a false paper trail for the purpose of dismissing her because
of her age and waited a year before presenting the fabricated record ...
recommending dismissal." 149
A less respectful attitude toward employer documentation is found in the
case of Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College District,150 an age and sex
discrimination case arising out of California. In this case, a female art professor
in her fifties claimed her employer subjected her to worse treatment than other
faculty members not part of the protected categories. The trial court granted
summary judgment stating that she had failed to establish a prima facie case.
The appellate court reversed, holding that proving discrimination is difficult
because "an employer's true motive in an employment decision is rarely easy
to discern." 151 The court felt that a thorough review of the employer's motives
would be necessary at trial, rather than being dispensed within a summaryjudgment review, because "without a searching inquiry into these motives,
1451d. at 828.
146 1d. at 822.
147940 F.2d at 826.
148938 F.2d 681 (6th Cir. 1991).
1491d. at 685.
150934 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1991).
151Id. at 1111 (quoting Lowe v. City of Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1009 (9th Cir. 1985))(quoting Peacock v. Duval, 694 F.2d 644, 646 (9th Cir. 1982)).
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those acting for impermissible motives could easily mask their behavior behind
a complex web of post hoc rationalizations[.]" 152
The First Circuit, however, in Medina-Munoz,153 seemed impressed with the
documentation produced by the employer. The personnel file reflected the
employee's history of tardiness, failure to meet deadlines, apparent distaste for
field supervision duties, hostile and negative attitude, and one instance of his
having shouted obscenities at a supervisor.154 The file seems to have been
particularly persuasive because the problems were reflected as having
"increased with the passage of time."155 The trial court, seemingly impressed
with the defendant's recordkeeping, granted summary judgment premised on
the plaintiff's failure to make out his prima facie case, specifically, in that he
failed to demonstrate that he had performed his job up to the defendant's
legitimate expectations. The First Circuit reasoned, despite the defendant's
"amplitudinously documented set of reasons, 156 that this put too great a
burden on the plaintiff's prima facie showing. The court opined that the
summary judgment was correct, however, due to the plaintiff's deficiencies at
the pretext stage.
Despite some courts' misgivings concerning the weight accorded employer
records, lack of records, or ambiguous records, such records or lack thereof will
often undo an employer's attempt to take the case away from the jury. In the
case of Kraus v. Sobel Corrugated Containers, Inc.,157 the Sixth Circuit criticized
the employer's weak file, noting: "that at the time of the firing there were no
documents in Kraus' file that demonstrated either that her work was
unsatisfactory or that her employer had given her prior notice that she was in
danger of losing her job."158
In Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., Inc.,159 the same court concluded
that suspicious notations of "Age" and "Minority" made in personnel files could
be viewed by a jury as evidence of discriminatory motive.160 The employer
tried to explain that the notations were made after the employees had departed
to indicate potential legal problems. 161 That concern appears to have turned
into a self-fulfilling prophesy.
152934 F.2d at 1111.
153 Medina Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Cq., 896 F.2d 5 (1st Cir. 1991).
154 1d. at 7.
155Id.
156Id. at 9.
157915 F.2d 227 (6th Cir. 1990).
1581d. at 228.
159915 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1990).
160 d. at 209.
16 1Id. at 205.
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In the Sixth Circuit case of Wheeler v. McKinley Enterprises,162 the employer's
detailed notes prepared immediately following his meetings with the
later-fired plaintiff gave credence to the employer's case, but the jury, after
hearing the evidence, was within its right to give more weight (or perhaps
sympathy) to the plaintiff. Since this was a case where the employer
complained that the trial court had not granted a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, the appellate court was constrained not to second-guess the jury
on matters of credibility. This case illustrates, perhaps, the often crucial nature
of summary judgment or directed verdict in age discrimination cases.
The jury in Wheeler was within its province to disbelieve the
contemporaneously prepared, detailed records of the employer. Certainly, such
records can be viewed as totally subjective and self-serving. Interestingly,
however, such records are often viewed as "objective." In Aungst,163 the Seventh
Circuit sustained the trial court's granting of a judgment notwithstanding the
verdict, citing at length the testimony of the plaintiff's supervisor concerning
the plaintiff's lack of "versatility."164 The jury concluded that the plaintiff was
terminated for age related discrimination. In dissent, Judge Cudahy stated that
the court's reliance on the supervisor's testimony, while it characterized the
plaintiff's as "self-serving," may well have "exactly reversed the order of
reliance" of the jury.165
In Billet the Third Circuit concluded that in the end "there was simply too
much objective evidence of problems with Billet's performance to make his
claim of pretext plausible."'166 The evidence were reports of incidents entered
into plaintiff's file by the supervisors. The plaintiff had different interpretations
of the events.167 In dissent, Judge Sloviter stated that "when there is objective
evidence (such as in this case the inclusion of Billet as a finalist for the position)
which could discredit the proffered subjective view, then it is the function of a
jury and not the court on a directed verdict to decide whether the ultimate
decision to terminate the plaintiff was tainted with the impermissible
consideration of age."168
In the case of Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,169 the Fourth Circuit
remarked that subjective poor evaluations could possibly tend to show that an
employer's proffered reasons were actually pretexts, but such proof is "close to
162937 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1991).
163Aungst v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 937 F.2d 1216 (7th Cir. 1991).
164Id. at 1220.
1651d. at 1220.
166940 F.2d 812, 828 (3d Cir. 1991).
1671d. at 832.
1681d. at 832.
169933 F.2d 231 (4th Cir. 1991).
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irrelevant."170 It might only be relevant if the "ratings were wildly out of line
with other indicia of an employee's performance. Then one may question
whether the rating system had a bias in its implementation." 171 Similarly, past
good evaluations will not, according to Billet, prove that the current bad
evaluations are suspicious, because "[t]o hold otherwise would be to hold that
things never change."172 But, in Colgan v. Fisher Scientific Co.,173 the Third
Circuit reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment where "after many
years of service with consistently good evaluations," when the plaintiff
declined to take early retirement, he was given substantial new responsibilities,
was given a surprise, premature evaluation, and received a substantially lower
evaluation than he ever had before. 174 The court acknowledged that on a
summary judgment review, it would be improper to decide, as a matter of law,
"that an inference of retaliation cannot be drawn."17 Finally, in Shager v. Upjohn
Co., 176 evidence that the plaintiff's deficiencies were exaggerated, and that his
outstanding sales record was ignored resulted in the Seventh Circuit finding
that his "marginal" rating was "inexplicable."177 Accordingly, the grant of
summary judgment in favor of the employer was reluctantly overturned. 178
1701d. at 235.
171Id. at n.4.
172940 F.2d 812,826 (3d Cir. 1991).
173935 F.2d 1407 (3d Cir. 1991).
174 d. at 1422.
175 Id.
176913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990).
1 77 d. at 400. The totality of factors in this case led the court to overturn the trial judge's
grant of summary judgment. These factors included demonstrated animosity from a
younger supervisor toward older personnel, and favorable evaluations to a younger,
less productive employee. The court indicated a less than favorable attitude toward the
routine granting of summary judgment, stating when a jury question would be raised
as follows:
This is not a case where the plaintiff's only evidence of age discrimination
is that he was replaced by a younger worker and that the stated ground
for firing him is spurious. That would be the kind of case that just barely
survives the employer's motion for summary judgment: a case where the
evidence of discrimination is entirely circumstantial, indirect.
Id. at 402.
1 78 1d. at 406. The court also said:
So we must reverse. We are not entirely happy in doing so, being perplexed
that the middle-aged should be thought an oppressed minority requiring
the protection of federal law. But that is none of our business as judges.
We also are sympathetic to the argument that.., the threat of such market
sanctions deters age discrimination at lower cost than the law can do with
its cumbersome and expensive machinery, its gross delays, its frequent
errors, and its potential for rigidifying the labor market. But this sanguine
view of the power of the marketplace was not shared by the framers and
supporters of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and we shall not
1993]
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D. The Effect Of Reduction in Force (On Creating a Heightened Standard of Proof
for the Plaintiff to Overcome)
One of the most prolific sources of age discrimination claims has been the
RIF, often brought about by adverse economic conditions or restructuring
flowing from many of the reorganizations and takeovers of the eighties. All of
the issues discussed above have been raised both inside and outside of the RIF
context. Courts have generally stated, however, that in RIF situations the
plaintiff has a greater burden than in non-RIF situations because economic
necessity or improved efficiency are bona fide legitimate reasons for dismissing
employees.
The Sixth Circuit case of Ridenour v. Lawson Co.,179 is a leading case on this
greater burden requirement. In that case the court declared that "a plaintiff
whose employment position is eliminated in a corporate reorganization or
work force reduction carries a heavier burden in supporting charges of
discrimination than does an employee discharged for other reasons."180 Courts
acknowledge that even in the most innocent RIF situations "someone has to
go. "181 The victim of a RIF must present direct, circumstantial, or statistical
evidence that age was a determining factor in his discharge.182
In Leichihman v. Pickwick Int'l,183 the Eighth Circuit modified the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case to cover the typical RIF situation. This situation exists
when an employee's position is terminated and no new employee is hired to
take over the responsibilities of the terminated employee; rather the employer
reassigns that work to others in the name of efficiency. In Leichihman, the court
modified the elements to be shown under McDonnell Douglas' indirect
approach as follows: (1) that the plaintiff was within the protected age group;
(2) that the plaintiff was performing at a level that met the employer's
legitimate expectations; (3) that despite such acceptable performance the
plaintiff was terminated 184; (4) that the plaintiff's job in its various parts
continued in existence; and (5) that the plaintiff's age was a determining factor
subvert the Act by upholding precipitate grants of summary judgment
to defendants.
Id. at 406-07.
179791 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1986).
1801d. at 57.
181Conkwright v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 933 F.2d 231, 235 (4th Cir. 1991).
182Id.
183814 F.2d 1263 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 855 (1987).
184It should be noted that the time for the employer to dispute this assertion by the
plaintiff is normally held to be at the rebuttal stage -where the employer proffers its
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons - and not at the prima facie case stage. See
McDonald v. Eastern Wyo. Mental Health Center 941 F.2d 1115,1119-20 (10th Cir. 1991)
where the court lists the various circuits in accord with that view.
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in the employer's actions.185 The court recognized that under some
circumstances this framework might require modification.186
The Leichihman framework was applied by the Eighth Circuit in the recent
case of Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Society.187 In Johnson, a summary
judgment was granted against a fifty-four year-old employee of the Historical
Society terminated under a reduction in force necessitated by reduced federal
funding. The trial court held that the plaintiff had failed to make his prima facie
case because he did not show that his job continued in existence after his
dismissal; but even if it did, the RIF was for bona fide economic reasons which
constitutes a legitimate, non-pretextual, nondiscriminatory reason which the
plaintiff had not contradicted.188 The appellate court reviewed its precedent,
noting that "summary judgments should seldom be used in cases alleging
employment discrimination,' 189 and that direct, "smoking gun," evidence is
seldom available in such cases. The court reversed the grant of summary
judgment because of the existence of conflicting evidence over whether some
of the plaintiff's job components still continued to exist.190 Additionally, there
was testimony that other employees at the Society had referred to the plaintiff
as a "blind old bat," "old coot," "blind old coot," and a "dirty old man."191 More
importantly, he introduced evidence that his supervisor mocked his back
problems and mimicked his posture and walk.192 The court, therefore,
reasoned that "it is a question of fact whether Johnson's age was a determining
factor in the Society's actions,"193 citing the factual case-by-case nature of
discrimination cases that requires courts "not be overly rigid in considering
evidence of discrimination offered by a plaintiff."194
The five-step Leichihman analysis combines elements from the standard
McDonnell Douglas approach (modified, of course, to accommodate the factual
difference of a RIF), with the plaintiff's burden of proof on pretext. Specifically,
the fifth step of Leichihman is similar to the way pretext is often shown, but
elevated to the prima facie case stage. Direct evidence of age animus, like that
offered in the Johnson case, is not a requirement. The fifth step can also be shown
185814 F.2d at 1268.
1861d. In some cases showing that age was a determining factor might eliminate the
fourth requirement of showing that the position continued to exist.
187931 F.2d 1239 (8th Cir. 1991).
1881d. at 1241.
1891d. at 1244.
190 1d. at 1243-45.
19 1/d. at 1244. The effect of disparaging remarks by fellow employees and supervisors
is discussed at length in section F. See infra section F.
192931 F.2d at 1244.
1931d.
1941d.
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by statistical evidence, such as a pattern of forced early retirements or fewer
promotions to older employees, or by circumstantial evidence such as a
generalized showing of preference "for younger employees in the business
organization."195 This does not seem to be a departure from the Supreme
Court's pretext analysis in McDonnell Douglas.196
What, then, is gained by adding the fifth step to the plaintiff's prima facie
case, rather than relying upon the plaintiff's pretext burden of proof? In the
case of Barnes v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc.,197 the Eleventh Circuit offered
the view that in an ADEA case, summary judgment must be granted under
Celotex if the plaintiff's showing is insufficient on any portion of the plaintiff's
prima facie case.
Not all courts have formally modified the McDonnell Douglas prima facie
case in the manner of the Eighth Circuit. The Eleventh Circuit has adopted a
three-step prima facie showing where the plaintiff must demonstrate: (1)
inclusion in the protected group; (2) qualifications for the position held prior
to the RIF; and (3) evidence of animus.198 The First Circuit, however, in the
Connell199 case made no reference to a higher burden in a RIF case. It must be
remembered, however, that the First Circuit has adopted an animus
requirement at the pretext stage that in many ways gives it the same effect as
if it were part of the prima facie case.
In the case of Hanchey v. Energas Co., 200 the Fifth Circuit reviewed a summary
judgment granted to an employer that closed one of its offices, ostensibly due
to the economic downturn in Louisiana in the eighties. The trial court granted
summary judgment to the defendant based on the plaintiff's failure to make a
prima facie case, the defendant's articulated reasons, and plaintiff's failure to
raise a jury question on pretext. The Fifth Circuit stated that even if a genuine
jury issue existed showing a prima facie case, there was still no genuine issue
concerning "whether Energas articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reasons for the actions in question and, if so, whether Hanchey failed to carry
her burden of showing that the reasons are pretexts for age discrimination."201
In Hanchey, the plaintiff had attempted to cast doubt on the financial
problems of her employer by pointing out that it had recently spent $61.5
million for another company, and that the town where she was employed was
not undergoing a financial downturn during the time period in question. The
1951d. at 1243.
196See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
197814 F.2d 607, 609 (11th Cir. 1987).
198Earley v. Champion Intl Corp., 907 F.2d 1077 (11th Cir. 1990).
199924 F.2d 1169 (1st Cir. 1991).
200925 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1990).
2011d. at 98.
[Vol. 41:103
30https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol41/iss1/6
INTENTIONAL AGE DISCRIMINATION
court found no credence in such arguments. 202 Bolstering the company's case
was its statistical evidence that in the RIF, of eleven positions eliminated, seven
were held by people younger than forty years of age.203 The Fifth Circuit,
therefore, did not feel uneasy about affirming the summary judgment due to a
failure of proof at the pretext level in light of the "implausibility" of the
plaintiff's arguments. This would seem an affirmation of the holding of
Celotex,2 04 even though the court made no reference to any of the cases in the
trilogy.
A case that demonstrates the difficulties faced by ADEA claimants who are
victims of RIFs brought about by mergers is Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co.2 05 In Rose,
two large banks in the same geographic area merged, resulting in a managerial
redundancy. The plaintiffs were two vice-presidents of the disappearing bank,
both in their fifties. The plaintiffs' unit was scaled-back, resulting in substantial
staff reductions. The decision of who would be released was "essentially left to
the discretion of the managers of the various bank departments."206 The
plaintiffs were not offered any other positions with the bank. The trial court
granted summary judgment based upon the plaintiffs' failure to demonstrate
that they were replaced by substantially younger employees with equal or
inferior qualifications. In fact, the judge concluded that their jobs simply
disappeared, and "they were not replaced by anyone, let alone younger persons
with similar qualifications."2 07
The Ninth Circuit used a standard four-step prima facie case analysis. 208 The
circuit court stated that its precedent would forgive the lack of such a showing
if the plaintiffs could "show through circumstantial, statistical, or direct
evidence that the discharge occurred under circumstances giving rise to an
2 02The plaintiff could not convince the Court that the total area served by the company
was not suffering an economic downturn, regardless of the possible fact that the
immediate area of her office was economically sound. Also, it felt that the purchase of
the other company confirmed, rather than refuted, the company's reasons, because it
may have found itself in need of higher profits. Id. at 98-99.
2 03 1d. at 98.
204Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986).
205902 F.2d 1417 (9th Cir. 1990).
2 061d. at 1420.
2 071d. at 1421.
208Id. The court stated further:
An employee may establish a prima facie case of age discrimination
under the disparate treatment theory by showing he: (1) was a member
of the protected class [age 40-70]; (2) was performing his job in a satis-
factory manner; (3) was discharged; and (4) was replaced by a substan-
tially younger employee with equal or inferior qualifications.
Id. (citation omitted).
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inference of age discrimination."209 Citing the Eighth Circuit's Leichihman 210
decision, the court noted that no inference of discrimination can be drawn from
a RIF where the position and duties are completely eliminated. 211 According
to the court, this completely eliminated the claim of one of the plaintiffs. 212
With respect to the other plaintiff, there was evidence that many of his
responsibilities were assumed by a younger employee some six months after
the plaintiff's discharge. Citing Sixth Circuit precedent,213 the Ninth Circuit
argued that this substantially weakened plaintiff's claim, and the plaintiff
should have produced "additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence
that age was a factor in his termination."214
Both plaintiffs offered four reasons in support of finding an inference of
discrimination: failure of the bank to follow its own procedures; failure to offer
new positions; references to them as part of an "old boys network;" and
statistical evidence from their expert that the merger resulted in a heavier
burden falling upon employees in the protected class. The court disposed of all
of these arguments, finding: misinterpretation of the manuals by plaintiffs; no
duty to transfer an employee terminated in a RIF (again following the Sixth
Circuit precedent); no animus being displayed in the "old boy network"
reference (as it is a colloquialism unrelated to age); and flawed statistics.215 The
court finally stated that although the replacement six months after the
discharge and the statistics might "arguably support an inference of
2 09 Id.
21OLeichihman v. Pickwick Int'l, 814 F.2d 1263, 1270 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 855 (1987).
211902 F.2d at 1421. ("If [the discharged employee] cannot show that [his employer]
had some continuing need for his skills and services in that his various duties were still
being performed, then the basis of his claim collapses.")(citations omitted).
2 12 d. at 1421-22. The court stated:
It is undisputed that most of Rose's responsibilities were eliminated due
to the loss of the Bracton accounts. Rose has otherwise presented no facts
which controvert Walker's deposition testimony that he was discharged
because 'the job that he did in S.A.D. [was] not performed in L.A.D.'
Moreover, there is no evidence to suggest that Rose's admittedly 'unique
function' was needed elsewhere at Wells Fargo. Rose's limited duties as
vice president were also duplicative of functions performed by Wells Fargo's
own managers prior to the merger. Rose does not claim that his counterpart
at Wells Fargo was younger or somehow less qualified than he.
Id. at 1422.
213 Simpson v. Midland-Ross Corp., 823 F.2d 937 (6th Cir. 1987).
214902 F.2d at 1422.
2 151d. at 1422-23. With respect to the flawed statistics, the Court noted that in order to
show a triable issue in that manner, there must be a "stark pattern of discrimination
unexplainable on grounds other than age." Id. In this case, such a showing was absent
because the casualties were greatest in upper management where older employees tend
to be the rule.
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discrimination . . we find that evidence insufficient to support a jury verdict
on the ultimate question of discrimination."216
It is hard to believe that the same Ninth Circuit handed down the
Sischo-Nownejad decision which expressed the argument that employers
motives are easily falsified, that summary judgments should rarely be granted,
and that the term "old warhorse" was direct evidence of discriminatory
intent.217 This seemingly contradictory stance is a stark indication that in a RIF
situation, the plaintiff can expect an extremely difficult time trying to avoid
summary judgment. A plaintiff who does not come into court with the
proverbial "smoking gun" will be likely to go away disappointed. At a
minimum, it would seem that a defendant should wait a sufficient time before
deciding to undo, as mistakes, various work reassignments brought about by
the RIP. By doing that, the employer can rely on the presumption that "time
heals all wounds," along with the defense that it merely made a stupid business
judgment (which seems to be a strong defense in ADEA cases if they are made
in good faith). Replacing older workers with new, younger workers in this
manner should be permissible under the Rose rationale.
A direct assault on the issue of whether there really was a RIF occurred in
the case of Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metropolitan Bottling Co., Inc.,218 where the losing
defendant appealed the trial court's refusal to grant a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. The defendant claimed the trial court should have
granted defendant a judgment as a matter of law, because there was undisputed
proof of an "economically mandated reduction in force."219 The defendant
argued this constituted a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for termination.
The court concluded that due to various inconsistencies in testimony and
company actions, the jury could reasonably have concluded that the "alleged
reduction in force was merely a pretext for discrimination."220 The judgment
was permitted to stand.
E. The Effect of Direct Evidence of Discriminatory Intent (On Creating a
Heightened Standard for the Defendant to Overcome)
Is the McDonnell Douglas approach the exclusive means of establishing a
prima facie case of age discrimination? While most of the reported cases launch
into a review of the "easy" McDonnell Douglas rationale, courts have recognized
alternative and more rigorous direct approaches. According to Judge Posner in
2 1 61d.
2 17Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104, 1112 (9th
Cir. 1991).
218915 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1990).
2 19 d. at 208.
22 0Id. at 209.
19931
33Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1993
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
Shager, "direct proof of age discrimination is a permissible alternative.., to
dancing through the McDonnell Douglas quadrille."221
According to the Ninth Circuit's Sischo-Nownejad222 case, when the plaintiff's
prima facie case consists of more than the McDonnell Douglas223 presumption,
because of the introduction of direct or circumstantial evidence, then "a factual
question will almost always exist with respect to any claim of a
nondiscriminatory reason."224 In Sischo-Nownejad, the direct evidence
consisted of evidence of more favorable treatment toward workers outside of
the protected class, and numerous statements probative of age and gender
bias.225 This case was tried as a "single motive" discrimination case-one in
which the motive for the employer's action was alleged to be age (or in that
case, age and sex) discrimination. The case was filed prior to the Supreme
Court's landmark "dual motive" sex discrimination case, Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins.226
In Price Waterhouse a female senior manager for a major accounting
partnership was denied partnership status. Based mainly upon written
comments submitted by partners to the partnership committee, she claimed
that she was the victim of "sex stereotyping"--a belief that females should or
should not act in certain ways that are considered more the province of
males.227 The employer emphasized a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its negative action: lack of interpersonal skills. The trial court judge found that
this reason was not fabricated as a pretext to discriminate. Male candidates who
were selected for partnership who similarly lacked interpersonal skills
legitimately possessed positive characteristics she lacked. Regardless of these
non-pretextual reasons, however, the trial and appellate courts, along with the
Supreme Court found in the plaintiff's favor, placing the burden of persuasion
22 1Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990). According to Justice
O'Connor in Price Waterhouse: 'Indeed, in one Age Discrimination in Employment Act
case, the Court seemed to indicate that 'the McDonnell Douglas test is inapplicable where
the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination."' 490 U.S. 228, 271-72 (1989)
(quoting Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)).
222 Sischo-Nownejad v. Merced Community College Dist., 934 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir.
1991).
223411 U.S. 792 (1972).
224934 F.2d at 1111.
22 5For the effect of derogatory remarks or age-related slurs see infra section F.
22 6 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
22 7The Court stated that an employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but
whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible
Catch-22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. Title
VII lifts women out of this bind. Id. at 251.
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upon the employer to demonstrate that it would have reached the same result
had there been no taint of illegal discrimination. 228
The possibility of mixed legitimate and illegitimate motives has long
troubled courts. Employees have complained in the past, for instance, that their
employers retaliated against them for exercising their statutory rights under
the Wagner Act, and that the employer's proffered "legitimate" reasons were
pretexts. The employer would present a list of infractions committed by the
employee upon which it claimed to have made its employment decision. In its
landmark decision in NLRB v. Transportation Management, Corp.,22 9 the Supreme
Court reversed the traditional burden of proof, requiring the defendant to
prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have made the same
decision absent the impermissible motive.23° Some employees, however,
deserve to be fired even though their employers' decisions were tainted by
improper motives. An employee, for instance, whose pro-union activities lead
the employer to attempt to punish that employee even though the law
promotes self-organization rights, can still be fired if he or she engages in
sufficient egregious activity, such as coming in drunk and attacking a number
of employees and managers. Such activity would not be permitted of any
employee whether they were for or against the union. If, however, the
legitimate and illegitimate motives cannot be separated, then the risk of loss is
fairly placed upon the employer who knowingly created the risk. This analysis
complies with the Court's opinion for the Court presumed: "[t]he employer is
a wrongdoer. 231
228This was an interesting plurality decision with Justices Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun and Stevens delivering the opinion of the Court. Justice White concurred in
the opinion, but feared that the plurality mistakenly placed a burden on the employer
to prove its case by "objective" evidence. Justice O'Connor concurred in the opinion, but
was concerned that the level of taint suggested by the plurality might be too low, even
though this was not a weak case for finding such taint. Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist,
and Scalia dissented. Seealso CIVIL RIGHTS AcTOF 1991, supra note 7, at § 107, which adds
§ 703(m) to Title VII and which states that "an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice." This new section overturns that portion of Price
Waterhouse that totally exonerated the defendant who could show that it would have
taken the same action despite its discriminatory activity. The new law also, however,
adds § 706(g)(2)(B), which, when the defendant can satisfy the Price Waterhouse
requirement of showing it would have taken the same action regardless, limits the
employer's liability to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, attorney's fees, and costs
directly attributable to bringing the claim, but not for damages, reinstatement, hiring,
or promotion. Interestingly, these 1991 changes do not apply to the ADEA.
229462 U.S. 393 (1983).
2 301d.
2311d. at 403.
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How does a mixed motive case differ, on its face, from a single motive case?
Justice White, in his Price Waterhouse concurring opinion, offered the following
analysis:
The Court has made clear that "mixed-motive" cases, such as the
present one, are different from pretext cases such as McDonnell Douglas
and Burdine. In pretext cases, "the issue is whether either illegal or legal
motives, but not both, were the 'true' motive behind the decision." In
mixed-motive cases, however, there is no one "true" motive behind the
decision. Instead, the decision is a result of multiple factors, at least one
of which is legitimate.
232
Must the employee choose whether to bring a single or dual motive case? The
plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse answered this question in the negative.233
Justice O'Connor expressly agreed with the plurality analysis on this point.234
The case may be filed as either, but, at some point the plaintiff must make a
choice.
In Visser v. Packer Engineering Associates, Inc.,235 the Seventh Circuit struggled
over a summary judgment granted by the trial court where a sixty-four year-old
executive was fired allegedly for "disloyalty" by his sixty-three year-old boss. 236
The fired executive was nine months short of full vesting rights toward his
pension.237 His premature dismissal resulted in a two-thirds loss in his
retirement benefits.238
The plaintiff successfully painted his boss in an unflattering light. The boss
was the corporate employer's founder, and he allegedly continued to run the
232490 U.S. 228, 260 (1989) (citations omitted).
233 The Court added:
Nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that a case must be
correctly labeled as either a 'pretext' case or a 'mixed motives' case from
the beginning in the district court; indeed, we expect that plaintiffs often will
allege, in the alternative, that their cases are both. Discovery often will be
necessary before the plaintiff can know whether both legitimate and
illegitimate considerations played a part in the decision against her. At
some point in the proceedings, of course, the district court must decide
whether a particular case involves mixed motives. If the plaintiff fails to
satisfy the factfinder that it is more likely than not that a forbidden charac-
teristic played a part in the employment decision, then she may prevail
only if she proves, following Burdine, that the employer's stated reason for
its decision is pretextual."
Id. at 247, n.12.
234 Id. at 277.
235924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir. 1991).
2361d. at 657.
23 7 d.
238Id.
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company as a personal fiefdom.239 Plaintiff and several other employees sat on
the board of directors and opposed the founder, who served as chairman of the
board.240 The dissidents were dismissed from the board, and several left the
company to begin a company of their own.241 The plaintiff stayed on, possibly
desiring to protect his retirement benefits. 242 The boss called the plaintiff into
his office and demanded he make a declaration of "unqualified loyalty."243
Plaintiff refused and was fired.244 He claimed that his dismissal was improper,
and the fact that his benefits were reduced should allow a presumption of
impermissible discrimination based on age. Initially, the court analyzed the
facts in light of the Price Waterhouse rationale. Following the wording of Justice
O'Connor, the court stated that in a mixed-motives case the illegal motive must
be "a sufficient condition, or but-for cause, of the employee's termination."245
The court held that not only was age not a substantial factor, but also there was
not an iota of evidence that age was any factor in the decision. 246 The fact that
the reduction in the plaintiff's benefits would save the company money was
not sufficient to create an inference of discrimination-neither for a dual motive
nor for McDonnell Douglas prima facie case analysis. 247 While noting that a
"smoking gun" is not required, circumstantial evidence, at a minimum, is
required.248 The timing of the firing did not arouse suspicion in the court since
the firing was precipitated by past events and not the "looming date of full
vesting of Visser's pension."249 Accordingly, the court affirmed the summary
judgment. In a terse dissent, Judge Cudahy stated that "a mean personality
should not provide an impregnable shield against claims that are objectively
plausible."250
2 391d. at 656.
240924 F.2d at 656.
2 411d.
2 42Id.
2 43/d.
2 441d. at 657.
245924 F.2d at 658.
2461d.
247Id. at 658.
248Id.
249/d.
250924 F.2d at 664 ("Apparently Packer would be easier to convict of age
discrimination if he were a kindly and forgiving soul with a short memory.") Another
dissent by Chief Justice Bauer is worth quoting:
My dissent is really occasioned by my conviction that summary judgment
is too rapid a disposition in this case, that sufficient factual questions remain
that belong to a jury. And when these factual questions unfold in the trial
setting there always remains a right in the court to correct or prevent a
verdict that is founded, not on the law and facts, but on sympathy and
19931
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F. The Effect of Derogatory Remarks and Talismanic Expressions (On Creating
a Genuine Issue of Material Fact, or On Creating a Dual Motive
Heightened Standard)
While direct evidence of discriminatory intent is not required to make a
prima facie case of intentional discrimination under McDonnell Douglas, it is a
plus. Demonstrating this evidence is useful as a supplement to the McDonnell
Douglas standard. Direct evidence creates the dual motives situation which has
the salutary effect of shifting the burden of proof to the defendant. So it would
seem to behoove a plaintiff seeking to avoid summary judgment or directed
verdict to inject as much direct evidence as possible, despite the cliche' that
"smoking gun" evidence of discriminatory intent is rarely to be found.251 The
most often used direct evidence is the age-related derogatory remark offered
to demonstrate an anti-age animus.
The leading case on derogatory remarks as evidence of discriminatory
animus is the sex discrimination case Price Waterhouse, where the plaintiff
introduced evidence that in their evaluations of plaintiff as a potential partner,
some existing partners wrote comments such as: "macho," "overcompensated
for being a woman," "take a course at charm school," and "tough talking
somewhat masculine. 2 52 The plurality stated that "remarks at work that are
based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in
a particular employment decision."253 They went on to say, however, the
remarks are certainly evidence that gender played a part. According to the
dissent "almost every plaintiff is certain to ask for a Price Waterhouse instruction,
perhaps on the basis of 'stray remarks. '"254
In agreement with the Price Waterhouse dissent, Judge Posner reiterated in
Shager: "Some stray remarks in the opinions in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins...
prejudice. I think we have denied the plaintiff in this case a basic right
of all mankind: the right to rise at least to the height of failing.
Id. at 664.
251See Castleman v. Acme Boot Co., 959 F.2d 1417,1420 (7th Cir. 1992) ("An employer,
of course, does not normally memorialize an intention to discriminate on the basis of
age. Direct evidence, such as an employer statement that reveals hostility to older
workers, is rarely found.")
2 52 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 440 U.S. 228, 235 (1989).
2 53Id. at 251.
2541d. at 291. The dissent stated:
One of their [trial courts] new tasks will be the generation of a jurisprudence
of the meaning of 'substantial factor'. Courts will also be required to make
the often subtle and difficult distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect'
or 'circumstantial evidence.' Lower courts long have had difficulty applying
McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. Addition of a second burden-shifting
mechanism, the application of which itself depends on assessment of
credibility and a determination whether evidence is sufficiently direct
and substantial, is not likely to lend clarity to the process.
Id. (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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addressed to the issue of stray remarks in discrimination cases, bid fair to create
a doctrine of 'stray remarks.' 255 In Shager, a young supervisor was quoted as
making statements derogatory to older workers and others in praise of young
workers.256 The court noted that these comments were ambiguous, but "the
task of disambiguating ambiguous utterances is for trial, not for summary
judgment."257 Citing Ninth Circuit precedent, the Seventh Circuit
acknowledged that the term "young" may be a legitimate "descriptive, not an
evaluative, term."2 8
In contrast, Second Circuit rulings could be construed as conferring
"talismanic significance" to the term "young."259 Judge Altimari, in a concurring
opinion in Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co.260, expressed the concern that the
Second Circuit had given talismanic significance to the term "overqualified" in
an earlier case, Taggart v. Time, Inc.,261 which then created a jury issue in Binder
where the employer had used a similar term "underemployed." In both Binder
and Taggart older employees lost their jobs in reorganizations, and were not
offered lesser positions (even at lesser pay) due to the employers' fears that the
older employees would become dissatisfied with these positions, suffer
frustration, poor job performance, and ultimately termination. Judge Altimari
felt that these decisions placed the employers in an untenable position: not to
offer the overqualified person the job and be sued, or offer the job and wait to
see if the bad results materialize. 262 Judge Altimari would allow the employer,
in its business judgment, to conclude that an applicant is overqualified for a
position without fear of an ADEA suit because "overqualified" was not a
buzzword for "too old."263 In a subsequent decision, the Second Circuit denied
Judge Altimari's characterization of Taggart and Binder, stating that they were
255Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 402 (7th Cir. 1990).
25 61d. at 400. 'These older people don't much like or much care for us baby boomers."
"[Tihe old guys know how to get around things." "It is refreshing to work with a young
man with such a wonderful outlook on life and on his job." Id.
2 5 7 1d.
2 581d. (citing Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1990)).
259 Binder v. Long Island Lighting Co., 933 F.2d 187, 194 (2nd Cir. 1991) (Altimari, J.,
dissenting).
2601d.
261924 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1991).
262933 F.2d at 194-95.
2631d. at 194.
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aimed at the "conclusory" statement of overqualification that could serve as a
"mask for age discrimination." 264
Similarly, in Aungst, judgment notwithstanding the verdict was sustained,
even though the employer terminated the plaintiff because he lacked
"versatility. 265 In dissent, Judge Cudahy felt that "'versatile' may be virtually
a synonym for 'young.'" 266 The Seventh Circuit refused to grant talismanic
significance to that term.
As discussed above, the Ninth Circuit has had an interesting time dealing
with "stray remarks." In Rose the court felt that the expression "old boys
network" is a mere "colloquialism unrelated to age."267 But, in Sischo-Nownejad,
it felt that calling an older female employee, "an old warhorse" was direct
evidence of discriminatory bias.268
The closest thing to easily available "smoking gun" direct evidence seems to
be age-related derogatory remarks such as those found in Minnesota Historical
Society where the employee was referred to as an "old coot," "dirty old man,"
and "blind old bat."269 Similarly, in Monarch Paper Co. the court looked askance
at a supervisor calling the plaintiff an "old man," and placing a banner in the
workplace stating "Wilson is 61d."270 Telling the plaintiff that he was "too old
to handle" a very large sales territory, referring to a terminated employee as an
"old bastard," saying that someone suffered from "the old salesman burnout
syndrome," and looking for "the I.B.M. type" were considered supportive of a
presumption of age discrimination in Normand v. R.I.A. 271 On the other hand,
the director of sales referring to the plaintiff as "el viejo" ("the old one") did not
aid the plaintiff's case against summary judgment in Medina-Munoz where
there was evidence that the supervisor was a "friendly, jovial person" who
habitually used nicknames for co-workers as "terms of endearment."272 But in
Levin v. Analysis & Technology, Inc.273 the court overturned summary judgment
26 4Bay v. Times Mirror Magazines, Inc., 936 F.2d 112,118 (2nd Cir. 1991). Seealso Stein
v. National City Bank, 942 F.2d 1062,1066 (6th Cir. 1991) ("The defendant's criterion in
Taggart amounted to a label - 'overqualified' - without any objective content. This
criterion would allow the employer to shift the standard at its pleasure, raising the
standard for some applicants and lowering it for others.")
265Aungst v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 937 F.2d 1216, 1226 (7th Cir. 1991).
2661d.
267Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990).
268See supra note 217.
2 69Johnson v. Minnesota Historical Soc'y, 931 F.2d 1239, 1244 (8th Cir. 1991).
2 7OWilson v. Monarch Paper Co., 939 F.2d 1138, 1140 (5th Cir. 1991).
271927 F.2d 857 (5th Cir. 1991).
272 Medina-Munoz v. RJ. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1991). The
court also said that "[tihe biases of one who neither makes nor influences the challenged
personnel decision are not probative in an employment discrimination case."
273960 F.2d 314 (2nd Cir. 1992).
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on appeal in large part due to evidence (not considered significant by the trial
judge) that the plaintiff was subjected to negative age related remarks. For
example, his superiors told him that he had memory loss, was set in his ways,
and was "over the hill."274 In addition, his supervisors playfully pushed him
into a chair with wheels and asked if he was ready for the wheelchair.275
It is important to reiterate that not all derogatory remarks are probative of
an intention to discriminate. Hence, these remarks may be considered as merely
"stray." Several courts have focused upon the status of the person making the
remark, asking whether that person became a decisionmaker with respect to
the plaintiff. In Danielson, the lack of age animus exercised by the terminating
decisionmaker swayed the court and the court ignored an allegedly
discriminatory statement made by the plaintiff's supervisor.276 In Normand, the
Fifth Circuit, while distinguishing the case before it, noted that seven circuits
had ignored discriminatory statements attributed to nondecisionmakers,
stating: "In these cases, the remarks attributed to the defendants were either
made by someone who did not participate in the decision to terminate the
plaintiff, or they were isolated comments and were the plaintiff's only evidence
of discrimination."277
In addition, the Eleventh Circuit has adopted a restrictive view of the
relevance of derogatory remarks. In Carter v. City ofMiami,278 it stated that "only
the most blatant remarks, whose intent could be nothing other than to
discriminate on the basis of age, . . constitute direct evidence of
discrimination."279 Lastly, the Fourth Circuit in E.E.O.C. v. Clay Printing Co., 280
viewing the totality of circumstances, ignored decision-maker comments
concerning the need for "young blood" and the need to attract younger
employees.281
IV. CONCLUSION
Reviewing the cases, it seems that in ADEA cases the trial and appellate
courts treated summary judgments as alive and well and routinely sustained
2741d. at 315.
2 75Id.
2 76Danielson v. City of Lorain, 938 F.2d 681, 684 (6th Cir. 1991).
2 77Normand v. Research Institute of America, Inc., 927 F.2d 857, 864, n.3 (5th Cir.
1991).
278870 F.2d 578 (11th Cir. 1989).
279Id. at 582.
280955 F.2d 936 (4th Cir. 1992).
281According to dissenting Judge Restani: "'he majority finds these comments
age-neutral. I question what type of evidence the majority would require before
permitting a plaintiff to prevail." Id. at 949, n.6. The majority underpinned its decision
on the holdings of Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) and Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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them. Whether this was the case because of crowded dockets, or fear of jury
sympathy, or because of Supreme Court encouragement via the summary
judgment trilogy is open to debate. Certainly the climate for granting summary
judgments improved after the trilogy. This is true because the trilogy cases were
both specific enough and yet vague enough to permit the appellate courts to
interpret them either as changing the law, or as applying only to the specific
types of cases before the court, or as not changing the status quo at all in view
of the court's assertions that judges should not invade the province of the jury.
The different circuit courts have viewed the standards for summary
judgment and directed verdict under Rule 56 and the trilogy differently. Some
appear more disposed to upholding summary judgments, while others seem
more disposed to leaving any possible factual disputes to the jury. Yet
affirmances of summary judgments and directed verdicts in ADEA cases have
been found in virtually all of the circuits.
The bottom line for plaintiffs' lawyers seeking to avoid those ultimate
ignominies, summary judgment and directed verdict, is to assure that their
cases include sufficient direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence of an
animus to their clients on the basis of age. While "smoking gun" evidence is not
required, it has never hurt the plaintiff's case. By invoking direct evidence of
age animus, a dual motive situation may arise, effectively insulating the case
from summary judgment and directed verdict. One can find too many cases
where statistical proof has been discredited, or where circumstantial evidence
has been called implausible, speculative, or conjectural.282 So, despite the
protestations to the contrary, it seems that direct evidence of animus from a
decisionmaker occurring close to the time of the adverse decision remains the
best prescription for reaching the jury.
282 See, e.g., Waggoner v. City of Garland, Texas, 987 F.2d 1160, 1166 (5th Cir. 1993)
("speculative conclusions," "conclusionary allegations"); Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co.,
977 F.2d 161,162 (5th Cir. 1992) ("gross statistical disparities generally are not enough
to rebut a valid, nondiscriminatory reason for discharge"); Chappell v. GTE Products
Corp., 803 F.2d 261, 268 (6th Cir. 1986) ("mere personal beliefs, conjecture and
speculation are insufficient to support an inference of age discrimination'). For cases
dealing with "implausibility" see supra Section III(C).
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